


~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WVINB 710717



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 17 July 1971







NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.

For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~


SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971
Weekly average for each month




APRIL 1971 - JULY 1971
Weekly data as reported

US BATTLE DEATHS dropped significantly to 11 from last week's 29.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

increased to 186 from last week's 123. The official total will change and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

stand at one regular and three small special purpose groups. The acceptance of one "gap fill" group raises the weekly total to 1,175 personnel and the infiltration estimate since 1 October 1970 to some 75,500-77,500.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

decreased to 378 from last week's 409.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

dropped to 975 from last week's 1,103.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces decreased to 79% from last week's 84%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, enemy-initiated activity remained at the low level which has prevailed for the past two weeks. Although the available evidence suggests that the Communists will probably soon attempt to initiate intensified military activity in the DMZ area, other parts of South Vietnam seem likely to remain comparatively quiet. As the GVN Lower House and Presidential elections draw nearer, however, the Communists intend to step up the level of terrorism and psychological harassment wherever they can.

Scattered light clashes and attacks by fire continue on the Plain of Jars, where government forces are still uncovering small enemy supply caches. During the past week, however, the Communists overran forward positions of an irregular battalion on the northeastern edge of the Plain, an action which suggests the Communists' counteroffensive may have begun. Even though the enemy forces east of the Plain are understrength and suffering acute ammunition and supply shortages, additional pressure from them should be forthcoming. Meanwhile, Vang Pao's irregulars have moved off the northern edge of the Plain in an attempt to link up with Meo forces proceeding south from Bouam Long. Elsewhere in Laos, the low level of combat continued as friendly efforts have been hampered by enemy resistance and the side effects of the third typhoon to brush the Panhandle in two weeks.

During the week in Cambodia, there were scattered small-unit contacts, but the overall level of Communist military activity remained low. The Communists have apparently run into some serious trouble in their efforts to build an effective Khmer Communist (KC) movement in the southwestern province of Kampot, where young Cambodians who had joined the VC/NVA are now deserting in large numbers. The high rate of defections has caused the VC to distrust the remaining KC cadres and to reclaim weapons from the KC guerrillas in various villages.

Infiltration

During the week, one battalion-size and three small, special purpose groups were detected moving south toward Cambodia/South Vietnam. These groups, coupled with the acceptance of one "gap fill," raise the estimate of infiltrators since 1 October 1970 to some 75,500 - 77,500. The evidence continues to indicate that infiltration starts have been completed for the current season. Gaps in the sequential numbering system, however, suggest that there are several other groups already in the system. During the week, it became apparent that various Binh Trams were not complying with the directive to cease using the two-watt radios, the basic communication media. To date, there has been a reduction in two-watt communication, but full implementation of this order has been erratic as the Binh Tram's have either misinterpreted the order or have not had other means of communication available to replace the two-watt radios.

South Vietnam Developments

Aides to Vice President Ky have confirmed that he is having difficulty acquiring the 100 endorsements from local councilors necessary to ensure his candidacy for President. As of 17 July, Ky had obtained only 24 signatures. Because of this problem, Ky released his open letter to President Thieu last week accusing the President in strong terms of preparing for a dishonest election by pressuring the councilors not to endorse opposition candidates. Ky is planning to release additional letters in order to shift the onus for his plight onto the President. Ky's candidacy now seems possible only if Thieu takes positive action to transfer to Ky some of the endorsements already gathered for himself. This is not a likely development, since Thieu's advisors -- and probably the President himself -- appear determined to make the election a two-man race between Minh and Thieu in order to assure that the latter attains a majority.

Communist Developments

In view of the current wave of speculation on U.S.-China developments, Hanoi apparently felt the need to restate, in a Nhan Dan editorial on 19 July, its own relatively standard orthodox Marxist tenets on the nature of U.S. imperialism and the Nixon doctrine, and thus implicitly offer its comments on U.S.-China developments without

explicitly acknowledging Dr. Kissinger's visit or President Nixon's proposed trip to Peking. The Nhan Dan editorial never mentions the Chinese. Nonetheless, the editorial's elaborate ideological analysis, its warnings that small countries like the DRV are masters of their own destinies, and its urging that North Vietnam uphold its "independent and sovereign line" all suggest displeasure at current U.S.-China developments and at least latent concern over the possible implications for Hanoi of a thaw in relations between Peking and Washington. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Lao Dong Party leadership, at Soviet urging, accepted a deal which failed to produce Communist political control over all of Vietnam and hence, in retrospect, is increasingly regarded by Hanoi as having been disadvantageous. Hanoi's leaders feel that at the close of the Franco-Vietminh conflict, Vietnamese Communist interests were sacrificed for the larger interests of their fraternal socialist allies. Sensitized thus by their own reading of recent history and conditioned by the whole sweep of Vietnamese history to regard the Chinese with skeptical suspicion, Hanoi's leaders are bound to be chary of the possible adverse consequences (for them) of any bilateral dealing between the U.S. and Communist China.

~~Top Secret~~